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Abstract: This study examines Japan’s preferential imports from three least developed countries (LDCs), 
i.e., Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, from 2013 to 2016. In these trade flows, two preference regimes are 
available in addition to a most favored nation regime: the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for 
LDCs (GSP-LDC) and a plurilateral trade agreement among Japan and ASEAN countries (AJCEP). We 
empirically examine how relaxing the rules of origin in GSP-LDC for knitted apparel in 2015 changed the 
utilization of the GSP-LDC and AJCEP regimes. Our identification strategy relies on comparisons not 
only between GSP-LDC and AJCEP but also between knitted and woven apparel. As a result, we found 
that such relaxation significantly increases the share of imports under the GSP-LDC regime out of total 
imports and reduces the share of imports under the AJCEP regime. We further investigate the main 
drivers of these changes in the shares. 
Keywords: Rules of origin; Least developed countries; Generalized system of preferences; Regional trade 
agreements 
JEL Classification: F15; F53 
                                                                                             
 
1. Introduction 
     The overlap of preference regimes (e.g., regional trade agreements (RTAs)) 
complicates firms’ choice of tariff regimes. For example, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) was formed among the U.S., Mexico, and Canada in 1995. When firms 
in Mexico export to Canada, they need to choose their tariff regime between NAFTA and a 
most favored nation (MFN) regime. Furthermore, on December 30, 2018, the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered 
into force among 11 countries including Canada and Mexico. Thus, firms in Mexico can now 
utilize CPTTP tariff rates in exporting to Canada. As a result, those firms need to choose 
their tariff regime between NAFTA, CPTPP, and MFN regimes. As implied in this example, 
firms’ choice of tariff regimes becomes complicated as the number of available preference 
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regimes increases. The number of RTAs has been growing particularly since the 2000s; thus, 
this issue of overlapping preference regimes is becoming more important. 
     In this paper, we empirically investigate how the reform of rules of origin (RoOs) in 
one preference regime changes the utilization of all available preference regimes. Tariff 
regimes differ regarding various elements including tariff rates and RoOs. RoOs are criteria 
to certify that exported products are originated in exporting countries. To receive 
preferential treatment regarding tariff payment, exporting firms have to comply with the 
RoOs specified in the preference regime. Even if one preference regime provides the lowest 
tariff rates among all available regimes, the RoOs in that regime might be most restrictive. 
Given these differences, firms will choose the best regime when multiple tariff regimes are 
available. Thus, in the above example, change to the RoOs in the NAFTA will affect not only 
the utilization of the NAFTA but also the utilization of the CPTPP and the MFN. The 
analysis on these effects of RoO change in one preference regime on the utilization or choice 
of tariff regimes will contribute to uncovering the interaction among tariff regimes when 
multiple regimes are available. 
     Specifically, we examine Japan’s imports of apparel products from three least 
developed countries (LDCs) from 2013 to 2016: Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. The critical 
reason for our focus on this import flow is that two preference regimes are available in 
addition to the MFN regime. One is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for LDCs 
(GSP-LDC). This regime is Japan’s unilateral tariff elimination against LDCs. The other is 
the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP), which is a plurilateral 
RTA among Japan and ASEAN member states including the above three LDCs. Exporters 
from these countries to Japan can choose their tariff regime among MFN, AJCEP, and GSP 
regimes. The data on imports under each regime are available in Japan’s Ministry of Finance 
on a monthly basis and at a Japanese tariff-line level, i.e., a nine-digit level of the harmonized 
system (HS) classification. By employing these country-product-level data, we investigate 
the effects of reforming RoOs on preference utilization. 
     There is a crucial advantage of focusing on Japan’s imports of apparel products that 
include the HS 61 classification, i.e., knitted or crocheted apparel and clothing (“knitted 
apparel”), and the HS 62 classification (“woven apparel”). As summarized in Table 1, the 
Japanese government revised the RoOs in GSP-LDC for knitted apparel in April 2015. Those 
are relaxed from the so-called two-stage processing (or double transformation) rule to a 
single-stage processing (or single transformation) rule. The former requires fabrics and yarn 
for garment manufacturing to be produced within exporting countries to qualify for 
preferential treatment, whereas the latter does not impose any restrictions on the source of 
materials for garment production. In other words, during our sample period, the RoOs in 
GSP for knitted apparel become less restrictive. On the other hand, RoOs in AJCEP did not 
change and remained a two-stage processing rule. In addition, RoOs in GSP-LDC and 
AJCEP for woven apparel are single-stage and two-stage processing rules, respectively, and 
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do not change during our sample period1 . Thus, only the RoOs in GSP-LDC for knitted 
products are relaxed during our sample period. 
 
 
Table 1. RoOs for Knitted Apparel and Woven Apparel in AJCEP and GSP-LDC 
Product Regime 2013 2014 2015 2016
HS61 Knitted AJCEP Double Double Double Double
HS61 Knitted GSP-LDC Double Double Single Single
HS62 Woven AJCEP Double Double Double Double
HS62 Woven GSP-LDC Single Single Single Single  
Source: Author’s compilation 
Note: “Single” and “Double” refer to single-stage processing and two-stage processing rules, respectively. 
 
 
     Our empirical analysis consists of the following three steps2. The first is to compare 
the utilization of GSP-LDC with that of AJCEP in the imports of knitted apparel. The 
utilization of a preference regime is measured by the share of imports under the preference 
regime out of total imports (the sum of imports under GSP-LDC, AJCEP, and MFN regimes), 
which is called the “utilization rate” of the preference regime. The reform of RoOs for 
knitted apparel in GSP-LDC is expected to affect the utilization of both GSP-LDC and AJCEP 
in knitted apparel; the comparison of utilization rates in knitted apparel between GSP-LDC 
and AJCEP shows the relative effects of relaxing RoOs in GSP-LDC on the choice between 
the two preference regimes. As a result, we found that the relaxation of RoOs in GSP-LDC 
raises the utilization rates of GSP-LDC relative to those of AJCEP by 69–83 percentage points. 
In the second step, to see the absolute effects, we compare the utilization rates in knitted 
apparel with those in woven apparel. While knitted and woven apparels share similar 
production materials, they are different in terms, simply, of whether knitted (or crocheted) 
or woven. In other words, despite their similarity, the revision of RoOs in GSP-LDC for 
knitted apparel will not have direct effects on preference utilization in woven apparel. By 
exploiting this nature, we conduct a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. Specifically, 
by comparing the effect on the utilization rate of GSP-LDC for knitted apparel with that for 
woven apparel, we will see the absolute effect of relaxing RoOs in GSP-LDC on the utilization 
rate of GSP-LDC. Similarly, the comparison in the utilization rate of AJCEP between knitted 
and woven apparels uncovers the absolute effect on the utilization rate of AJCEP. As a result, 
                                                   
1 More precisely, there are some woven apparel products that follow the two-stage processing rule in 
the GSP-LDC regime. In our empirical analysis, we do not exclude such woven apparel products because 
their RoOs do not change and are the two-stage processing throughout the sample period. We discuss 
this issue again in Section 4. 
2 The first and second steps are graphically explained in Appendix A. 
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we found that the relaxation of RoOs in GSP-LDC significantly increases the utilization rate 
of GSP-LDC by 32–57 percentage points and results in a significant reduction in the 
utilization rate of AJCEP imports by 12–20 percentage points. 
     The last step is to examine the driving forces underlying the absolute effects described 
above. The utilization rate takes a share-form. Thus, even if the relaxation of RoOs does not 
change imports under the AJCEP regime at all, the increase in imports under GSP-LDC not 
only raises the share of GSP-LDC imports but also decreases the share of AJCEP imports. To 
uncover the source of changes in the utilization rates of each preferential regime, we 
investigate the level of imports under each tariff regime. In particular, we examine the source 
of the larger absolute effect in GSP-LDC imports (32–57 percentage points) in comparison 
with AJCEP imports (12–20 percentage points). Although there are various possible cases to 
yield this result, we found an insignificant change of the level of imports under AJCEP, 
which implies that the switching of firms from AJCEP to GSP-LDC is not a main driving 
force. On the other hand, we found that switching from MFN to GSP-LDC is one of the main 
drivers; however, this is still inadequate to fully explain the larger absolute effect in GSP-
LDC imports. These results imply the existence of other possible drivers, such as the increase 
in export from existing GSP-LDC users and the start of export under the GSP-LDC regime. 
     This paper contributes to two types of literature on the determinants of preference 
utilization3 . First, Bureau et al. (2007), Manchin (2006), and Hayakawa et al. (2019) are 
studies that focus on the case where multiple preference regimes are available, as this paper 
does. In particular, Hayakawa et al. (2019) shed light on the difference in preferential tariff 
rates across preference regimes by examining the choice between AJCEP and bilateral RTAs 
in Japan’s imports from Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. As a 
result, they found that the change of preferential tariff rates in one RTA affects not only the 
utilization of that RTA but also the utilization of another RTA. In contrast, this study sheds 
light on the interaction across preference regimes through RoOs. In this sense, these studies 
are complementary. This study is the first to examine how the reform of RoOs in one 
preference regime affects the utilization of all available preference regimes. 
Second, some studies examine the negative effects of RoOs on preference utilization. 
For example, Carrere and de Melo (2006) found that the negative effect of the regional value 
content rule on NAFTA utilization rates is larger than the negative effect of the change-in-
chapter rule4. RoOs usually do not change over time; therefore, the identification strategy in 
these studies relies mainly on the difference in RoOs across products. However, the type of 
                                                   
3 The data on trade values according to tariff regimes are also used when examining the allocation of 
saved preference margin between exporters and importers (Cadot et al., 2005; Olarreaga and Ozden, 2005; 
Ozden and Sharma, 2006; Cirera, 2014). 
4 There are some empirical studies that evaluate the restrictiveness of RoOs by employing the index 
proposed in Estevadeordal (2000). See, for example, Cadot et al. (2006), Estevadeordal and Suominen 
(2004), and Hayakawa et al. (2014). Conconi et al. (2018) also examined the impacts of RoO on trade 
diversion in inputs. 
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RoOs tends to be determined based on some product characteristics. For example, RoOs for 
apparel products are likely to be the technical requirement rules (e.g., single/two-stage 
processing rules) due to their clear production processes. As a result, in the cross-product 
analysis, the difference in preference utilization across types of RoOs is likely to contain the 
difference in product characteristics. In contrast, this study exploits the time-series change of 
RoOs within the same product. Thus, our estimates will capture the more causal effects of 
RoOs, especially the effects of relaxing RoOs from the two-stage to the single-stage 
processing rule5. 
In addition, more broadly, our paper belongs to the large body of literature on the 
evaluation of trade creation in the nonreciprocal preferential trade agreements (NRPTAs) 
including GSP. Recent examples include Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010), Aiello and 
Demaria (2010), Herz and Wagner (2011), Gil-Pareja et al. (2014), and Ito and Aoyagi (2019). 
Although the trade creation effect in the context of NRPTAs is still controversial in these 
existing studies, their analyses are based on data on total trade values rather than trade 
values under NRPTAs. Therefore, unlike our third step above, those studies cannot 
investigate the mechanism underlying the change of total trade values6. By using the data 
on trade values by tariff regimes, we can uncover how the trade values under each tariff 
regime change behind the increase of total trade. There is a clear advantage in using such 
data when evaluating trade creation in preference regimes including the NRPTAs. 
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces AJCEP and 
Japan’s GSP. In particular, we discuss some differences between the two tariff regimes. After 
presenting our empirical framework in Section 3, we report our estimation results on the 
effect of relaxing RoOs on preference utilization in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
     In this section, we introduce AJCEP and Japan’s GSP. The Japanese government 
announced Japan’s RTA strategy in October 20027, which states that RTAs offer a means of 
strengthening partnerships in areas not covered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and of achieving liberalization beyond levels attainable under the WTO. The RTA with 
Singapore, which came into force the following month (November 2002), was the first RTA 
                                                   
5 In this sense, our strategy is similar to that in Andersson (2016), Augier et al. (2015), Bombarda and 
Gamberoni (2013), Gasiorek et al. (2009), and Tanaka (2018). These studies investigate the trade effect of 
RoOs relaxation by examining the time-series change of cumulation base (i.e., from bilateral to diagonal 
cumulation) or of product-specific rules mainly in Europe. However, they investigate the change of total 
trade values rather than those imported under preference regimes. Therefore, those studies neither 
consider the choice among tariff regimes nor clarify how the trade under each regime changes. 
6 In the context of NRPTAs, the data on trade values according to tariff regimes are employed by some 
studies (e.g., Francois et al., 2006; Hakobyan, 2015). However, those studies examine only the extent of 
NRPTA utilization rather than its trade creation effect. 
7 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/strategy0210.html 
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for Japan. Following this, Japan concluded bilateral RTAs with many countries, mainly 
ASEAN countries, including Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam. 
Furthermore, to enhance the regional production/distribution networks developed by 
Japanese firms in ASEAN, Japan also concluded a plurilateral RTA with ASEAN as a whole 
(AJCEP), which came into force in 2008. The cumulation rule in the RoOs in AJCEP, which 
is discussed later in this section, is expected to enable Japanese multinational firms to trade 
parts and finished products without paying tariffs among ASEAN countries and Japan. 
     On the other hand, Japan’s GSP has been available since 19718. Under its GSP regime, 
Japan applies reduced tariffs to designated import products originating from developing 
countries/territories, aiming to help them increase export income, advance industrialization, 
and promote economic development. In particular, almost all products (98.1% of all tariff 
lines) originating from LDCs are given special preferential treatment. They are given duty- 
and quota-free market access. Among ASEAN, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are 
beneficiaries of Japan’s GSP-LDC. Importantly, this GSP-LDC regime is available even if the 
beneficiaries conclude on RTAs with Japan. Therefore, exporters in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Myanmar are required to choose a tariff regime among GSP-LDC, AJCEP, and MFN. 
     The RoOs for apparel products, which is the focus of this paper, are as follows. Until 
March 2015, the RoOs for knitted apparel had been two-stage processing in GSP-LDC such 
that both processes of “spinning” and “knitting” were required to receive preferential tariff 
treatment. Such a two-stage processing rule was also adopted for knitted apparel in AJCEP. 
However, in April 2015, the Japanese government relaxed RoOs in GSP-LDC to single-stage 
processing to further encourage LDCs to export knitted apparel. Thus, since then, RoOs in 
GSP-LDC have been less restrictive than those in AJCEP. On the other hand, in the case of 
woven apparel products, which require materials and production processes similar to that 
of knitted apparel products, RoOs have been single-stage processing in GSP-LDC and two-
stage processing in AJCEP. 
     The revision of RoOs for knitted apparel in GSP-LDC in 2015 could be taken as an 
exogenous change for the three LDCs in ASEAN because one of the crucial triggers on this 
revision was the request by Bangladesh, which is one of the major exporters of apparel 
products to Japan. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, officially visited Bangladesh 
from September 6–7, 2014 on the invitation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and, based on 
that request, “Prime Minister Abe expressed that relevant ministries started their further 
consideration of reviewing the existing rules of origin of Japanese GSP scheme for knitted 
articles (Chapter 61 of the HS)9.” Based on this statement, the Council on Customs, Tariff, 
Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions in the Ministry of Finance proposed to relax RoOs 
                                                   
8 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/gsp/explain.html 
9 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000050978.pdf 
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in HS 61 to single-stage processing on November 14, 201410. The three LDCs in ASEAN did 
not play a significant role in these processes. 
Although tariff rates have been already eliminated, i.e., zero, for all apparel products 
(including both knitted and woven apparel) under both GSP-LDC and AJCEP at least since 
2013, there remain some differences between the two preference regimes. First, in the case 
of the GSP regime, to receive preferential tariff treatment, the goods to be imported have to 
be directly consigned to Japan in principle. In AJCEP, on the other hand, it is allowed for 
firms to store their export products in a bonded warehouse in a third country and to export 
to Japan under the AJCEP regime when orders are received from Japan. Second, cumulation 
among ASEAN countries (and Japan) is allowed in the compliance of RoOs only for AJCEP. 
Thus, if both production processes (i.e., processes of spinning and knitting) are conducted 
within ASEAN, the two-stage processing rule in AJCEP may not be restrictive in comparison 
to complying with the single-stage processing rule in GSP-LDC. On the other hand, 
materials produced in Japan can be allowed to be cumulated in not only AJCEP but also 
GSP-LDC11. 
     Practically, based on the difference in the cumulation base, the source of fabrics in the 
three LDCs is likely China, Japan, or Thailand. These LDCs cannot produce fabrics by 
themselves and, thus, need to import from other, mostly neighboring, countries. As 
mentioned above, because the two-stage processing rule in GSP-LDC requires fabrics to be 
produced in export countries or to use those produced in Japan, it is difficult to comply with 
the two-stage processing rule unless using fabrics produced in Japan. In the case of AJCEP, 
on the other hand, due to the above-mentioned cumulation rule 12 , apparel products 
produced in the LDCs can comply with the two-stage processing rule if firms use fabrics 
produced in Thailand and cumulate those to certify the origin of the apparel products. After 
the RoOs in GSP-LDC become single-stage processing, LDCs can enjoy preferential exports 
even if they use fabrics produced in China, which are cheaper than those produced in 
                                                   
10 In this proposition, the Council claimed that most of the domestic demand for knitted apparel is met 
by imported products. As is consistent with this claim, the import penetration ratio in knitted apparel, 
which is computed by using Japan’s Input–Output Table for 2011 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications), shows approximately 80%. 
11 More precisely, “cumulation rule” is a bit different between GSP and AJCEP. In GSP, it is called “donor 
country content rule,” which allows the use of imports from Japan. Importantly, such inputs do not need 
to be originated in Japan. Thus, it is practically possible to use the fabrics made in China when utilizing 
the GSP-LDC regime if those fabrics are first exported to Japan and then from Japan to the LDCs. 
However, when importing fabrics from China into Japan, firms have to pay customs duty in Japan’s 
customs. In addition, it costs more to transport from China to the LDCs via Japan than to directly 
transport from China to the LDCs. 
12 Indeed, as shown in Hayakawa (2015), Thailand exports cotton (HS52) and man-made filaments 
(HS54) to the LDCs under AJCEP. 
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Thailand and Japan13. In short, depending on tariff regimes and RoOs, LDCs need to adapt 
their source of materials14. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
     This section provides our empirical framework to examine how the reform of RoOs in 
one preference regime changes the utilization of all available preference regimes. We first 
specify our estimation equation and then overview Japan’s preferential imports. 
 
3.1. Specification 
We start by examining the preference utilization in Japan’s imports of only knitted 
apparel from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar from 2013 to 2016. In these imports, AJCEP 
and GSP-LDC regimes, in addition to the MFN regime, are available. From a theoretical 
point of view, various elements affect preference utilization. Demidova and Krishna (2008) 
and Cherkashin et al. (2015) demonstrate that a larger preference margin (i.e., MFN rates 
minus preferential tariff rates), less restrictive RoOs in terms of lower input adjustment costs, 
higher productivity, and lower fixed costs for preference utilization (e.g., documentation 
costs to certify the origin of goods) lead to the higher utilization of preference. The 
significant role of these basic elements has been empirically shown in previous studies on 
preference utilization rates. For example, Cadot et al. (2006) and Carrere and de Melo (2006) 
found the positive effect of preference margin and the negative effect of RoOs. Thus, in our 
case, the larger preference margin in the AJCEP (the GSP-LDC) will result in the higher 
utilization rate of the AJCEP regime (the GSP-LDC regime). The relaxation of RoOs in the 
GSP-LDC is also expected to have a positive effect on the utilization rate of the GSP-LDC. 
Furthermore, Hayakawa et al. (Online Appendix, 2019) theoretically examine the 
determinants of preference utilization rates when multiple preference regimes are available. 
Suppose that exporters choose the best tariff regime, i.e., which yields the highest exporting 
profits, among all available regimes. In this case, for example, the reduction of preferential 
tariffs in a preference regime encourages the exporting firms using other regimes (including 
MFN regime) to switch to choose that preference regime. Such tariff reduction also increases 
exports by existing users of that preference regime. These effects on so-called “extensive 
                                                   
13 We discuss and show such differences in the material prices in Section 4.4. 
14 According to the Survey of Japanese-affiliated firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania conducted by Japan 
External Trade Organization (JETRO), among Japanese affiliates in apparel industry (including both 
knitted and woven apparel) who export from the three LDCs to Japan, the average procurement shares 
from Japan, the other ASEAN countries, and China are 20%, 30%, and 46% in 2013, respectively. Then, 
those shares, respectively, change to 25%, 12%, and 53% in 2016. These three sources account for more 
than 90% of total procurement value for apparel exporters in the three LDCs. In addition, the 
procurement share from the other ASEAN countries declines while that from China rises. 
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margin” and “intensive margin” result in raising the product-level share of imports under 
that preference regime and decreasing the shares of imports under the other regimes. In 
short, the utilization rate of a preference regime is affected by not only the own preference’s 
characteristics but also the other preferences’ characteristics. These mechanisms suggest that 
the relaxation of RoOs in GSP-LDC is expected to have positive and negative effects on the 
utilization rates of GSP-LDC and AJCEP regimes, respectively. 
Based on these theoretical determinants, we specify our simple reduced-form model 
as follows: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 × 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑟 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 + u𝑖𝑝𝑟 + u𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑡.                        (1) 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑡  is the share of imports of knitted apparel product p from country i under 
preference regime r in year t out of total imports of product p from country i in year t15. The 
denominator is the sum of imports under the MFN, AJCEP, and GSP-LDC regimes. Sample 
products are defined at an HS nine-digit level, Japan’s tariff-line level, and include the codes 
in the HS 61. The sample preference regimes include AJCEP and GSP-LDC. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 is 
the dummy variable taking the value of one if year t is either 2015 or 2016 and zero otherwise. 
𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑟 takes the value of one if regime r is GSP-LDC and zero if it is AJCEP. u𝑖𝑝𝑟 and u𝑖𝑝𝑡 
are country-product-regime and country-product-year fixed effects, respectively. Last, 𝜖𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑡 
is a disturbance term. 
     We introduce all possible combinations of fixed effects, taking as given that our main 
variable, i.e., an interaction term, has a regime-year dimension. These fixed effects control 
various elements discussed above. Preferential tariff rates in both AJCEP and GSP-LDC are 
zero in all knitted apparel products, thus, the preference margins of both preference regimes 
with the MFN regime are exactly the same as the level of MFN tariff rates, which is 
controlled by product-related fixed effects16. We exclude products with zero MFN rates, i.e., 
zero-preference margin, from our sample products (only four products). The productivity 
distribution and fixed costs for preference utilization in each exporting country are 
controlled by country-product-year fixed effects. The effects of RoOs are discussed below. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the two preference regimes are different regarding 
direct consignment and cumulation. Importantly, these regime-specific characteristics do 
not change over time, at least in our sample. Therefore, no other regime-specific time-variant 
characteristics will affect the preference utilization rates (i.e., no confounding factors in our 
model). The time-invariant regime-specific characteristics are controlled by country-
product-regime fixed effects17. 
                                                   
15 The observations in which the denominator of the dependent variable is zero are excluded from our 
estimation sample. The denominator is country-product-year specific; therefore, the selection mechanism 
here is controlled by our inclusion of country-product-year fixed effects. The observations with a zero-
valued numerator are included in our estimation sample. 
16 MFN rates in all products do not change over time during our sample period. Even if those change, 
our product-year fixed effects completely control for MFN rates. 
17 Although we do not explicitly consider the role of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), country-product-year 
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     By controlling for these elements by our fixed effects, we capture the effects of relaxing 
RoOs by the coefficient for the interaction term 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 × 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑟. Under the AJCEP regime, 
RoOs do not change over time in our sample. The effects of time-invariant RoOs are 
controlled by product-regime-related fixed effects; therefore, the coefficient for the 
interaction term indicates the effect of RoO relaxation from two-stage processing to single-
stage processing on preference utilization. Such relaxation of RoOs will have positive and 
negative effects on the utilization of GSP-LDC and AJCEP, respectively. Thus, our estimates 
from the sample pooling imports under the two preference regimes show the relative 
magnitude of these contrasting effects within a product. In this sense, our empirical 
framework is not the same as the standard DID method. Nevertheless, the interaction term 
per se can be taken as an exogenous variable for exporters in the three LDCs because 
Bangladesh, not the three LDCs, was a key player in this revision of RoOs as mentioned in 
the previous section. In short, our estimates show the relative magnitude of the effects but 
should be econometrically consistent. Later, we also investigate the absolute effect by adding 
imports of woven apparel products (HS62) in our estimation. 
 
3.2. Data Overview 
     The source of the product-level data on imports by tariff regimes is the Trade Statistics 
from Japan’s Ministry of Finance. These data cover all commodity imports for Japan. We 
aggregate our import data according to Japanese fiscal years (from the beginning of April to 
the end of March) because the above reform of RoOs in knitted apparel started on April 1, 
2015. In Japan’s tariff system, tariff-line codes in a small number of products change even 
during the period of the same HS version (i.e., HS 2012 in our case). Specifically, new 
numbers are created when some tariff-line-level codes are integrated or are differentiated 
within the same HS six-digit code. By using the converter of tariff-line codes presented by 
the Japan Tariff Association18, we create nine-digit codes common across years, which are 
used to define product-related fixed effects. As a result, the HS 61 includes 263 tariff-line 
codes. The average, median, minimum, and maximum values of MFN rates are, respectively, 
9.2%, 8.4%, 5%, and 10.9%. 
 
                                                   
fixed effects will contribute to controlling for NTBs in Japan. Hakobyan (2015) also introduced the share 
of local content values added for the production of exporting products when examining the utilization 
rates of GSP in the U.S. This variable plays a good role in examining the effects of RoOs in her context 
because the RoOs for all products are the regional value content rule in the U.S. GSP. On the other hand, 
specific process rules are set to our sample products. Thus, use of the local content share is not 
appropriate in our context. In addition, Francois et al. (2006) and Manchin (2006) introduce some gravity 
variables such as GDP, population size, distance, or the past colonial relationship. In our empirical model, 
these elements are controlled by country-product-related fixed effects. 
18 http://www.kanzei.or.jp/english/ 
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Figure 1. Imports from the Three LDCs (Left Axis) and Their Shares in Imports from the 
World (Right Axis) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using Trade Statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Finance. 
Note: “Woven or Knitted imports from LDC3” refers to the total import values of woven or knitted 
apparel from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. The values are rescaled to be the value of one as of 2013. 
“Share of LDC3 in Woven or Knitted” is the share of imports from those three countries out of total 
imports of woven or knitted apparel from the world. 
 
 
     Before showing our estimation results, we take an overview of Japan’s imports of 
apparel products. Figure 1 shows the total import values of woven or knitted apparel from 
the three LDCs (Woven or Knitted imports from LDC3). This figure comprises all apparel 
products including those with zero MFN rates. The values are rescaled to be the value of 
one as of 2013. The import values from the three LDCs experience a steady increase in both 
knitted and woven apparels. In particular, their increase in knitted apparel in 2015 looks 
remarkable. The imports of knitted apparel in 2015 become nearly three times larger than 
those in 2013. The share of these imports from the three countries out of total imports from 
the world is also shown in the figure (Share of LDC3 in Woven or Knitted). The share in knitted 
apparel rises by three percentage points, from 1% in 2013 to 4% in 2016. Thus, during this 
period, the presence of these three LDCs in Japan’s market for knitted apparel increases, but 
it is still very low. On the other hand, the share in woven apparel is higher than that in 
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knitted apparel and rises from near 5% in 2013 to near 8% in 2016. In both, therefore, the 
share of Japan’s imports from the three LDCs is still not relevant.  
Next, we overview the preferential imports of apparel products from the three LDCs. 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the share of GSP-LDC imports from the three countries out 
of total imports from those countries. In this figure, we do not include apparel products with 
zero MFN rates19. We aggregate into imports of knitted apparel (HS61) and woven apparel 
(HS62) separately and rescale each share to be the value of one as of 2013. It is found that 
the share of GSP-LDC imports in knitted apparel dramatically rises from 2015, which is the 
year when RoOs were relaxed to single-stage processing. On the other hand, the share in 
woven apparel remains almost constant during the whole period. The case of AJCEP 
imports is shown in Figure 3. From 2015, the shares sharply decline in both knitted and 
woven apparel; however, the decline in knitted apparel is more remarkable. Thus, these two 
figures indicate the contrasting trend in knitted apparel imports between two preference 
regimes; in other words, compared with woven apparel, the share of GSP-LDC imports in 
knitted apparel increases while that of AJCEP in knitted apparel imports decreases20. 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of GSP-LDC Imports in Total Imports 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using Trade Statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Finance. 
Note: Each share is rescaled to be the value of one as of 2013. 
 
                                                   
19 As mentioned above, in our sample, MFN rates do not change over time. 
20 These similar trends before 2015 may indicate the validity of the "parallel trend assumption" in our 
analysis. 
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Figure 3. Share of AJCEP Imports in Total Imports 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using Trade Statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Finance. 
Note: Each share is rescaled to be the value of one as of 2013. 
 
     The above shares are shown by export countries in Table 2. There are four noteworthy 
points. First, we can see the similar time-trend as in Figures 2 and 3, that is, the share of GSP-
LDC imports in knitted apparel remarkably increases while that of AJCEP imports decreases. 
Second, except for a few cases, the sum of import shares under two preferences is near the 
value of one. This implies that most of the imports are conducted under either AJCEP or 
GSP-LDC rather than under the MFN regime. Third, while most of the imports in woven 
apparel are done under GSP-LDC, the share of AJCEP imports in knitted apparel is higher 
than that of GSP-LDC particularly before the RoO reform, i.e., 2015. Especially in Laos, even 
after the reform, the share of AJCEP imports is still higher than that of GSP-LDC. The rather 
high share of GSP-LDC imports in woven apparel would be because of the less restrictive 
RoOs in GSP-LDC (RoOs in GSP-LDC and AJCEP are single-stage processing and two-stage 
processing rules, respectively). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
     This section reports our estimation results. We first estimate Eq. (1) and then conduct 
some robustness checks. Next, by modifying our model, we show the absolute effects on 
two preference regimes separately. We also investigate the impacts on the level of import 
values under each regime. Last, we examine the change of import prices to investigate the 
possible change of the materials through the relaxation of RoOs. 
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Table 2. Shares of Preferential Imports in Total Imports 
Exporter Year AJCEP GSP-LDC AJCEP GSP-LDC
Cambodia
2013 0.35 0.22 0.02 0.94
2014 0.41 0.28 0.02 0.95
2015 0.23 0.66 0.02 0.96
2016 0.07 0.86 0.01 0.96
Laos
2013 0.87 0.00 0.05 0.94
2014 0.89 0.05 0.01 0.97
2015 0.81 0.16 0.01 0.98
2016 0.91 0.06 0.02 0.98
Myanmar
2013 0.38 0.15 0.01 0.98
2014 0.51 0.20 0.01 0.98
2015 0.17 0.82 0.01 0.99
2016 0.09 0.89 0.01 0.98
Knitted Apparel Woven Apparel
 
Source: Author’s computation using Trade Statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Finance. 
 
4.1. Relative Impacts on Shares 
     Column (I) in Table 3 reports our estimation result for Eq. (1)21. Our dependent variable 
lies in the unit interval; therefore, the ideal method for estimation is the fractional logit 
estimation technique proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). However, as discussed in 
the previous section, we need to introduce many kinds of fixed effects, which makes us 
difficult to obtain the convergence of log-likelihood when we estimate by fractional logit 
models. Also, there is an interpretation issue of the interaction term in the non-linear models 
(Puhani, 2012). Therefore, we first estimate Eq. (1) by the ordinary least square (OLS) 
method. The coefficient for an interaction term is estimated to be significantly positive, 
indicating that the relaxation of RoOs in the GSP-LDC regime increases the GSP-LDC 
utilization rate relative to the AJCEP utilization rate as is consistent with our expectation. 
     In column (II), as a robustness check for our result in column (I), we estimate our 
model by the fractional logit model (Frac). Indeed, the result by OLS in column (I) shows a 
very large effect, which is the expansion of the share of GSP-LDC imports by 83 percentage 
points relative to the share of AJCEP imports. One reason for this large effect might be our 
                                                   
21 Originally, our dataset included 263 dutiable knitted apparel products, three countries, and four years. 
Thus, the total number of observations was expected to be 3,156 (= 263 x 3 x 4). However, country-
product-year pairs were dropped if they had zero-valued denominators in the dependent variable. 
Depending on the estimation method and set of fixed effects, singleton observations were also dropped. 
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use of OLS techniques for our model, in which the dependent variable lies in the unit 
interval. On the other hand, as mentioned above, we cannot control for all fixed effects 
included in Eq. (1) when employing the non-linear estimation techniques. Therefore, in 
column (II), we control for the only export country, product, tariff regime, and year fixed 
effects and then estimate by the fractional logit model. The coefficient for the interaction 
term is again estimated to be significantly positive. The absolute magnitude of the coefficient 
decreases and indicates the expansion of the share by 69 percentage points. 
 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results for Knitted Apparel 
(I) (II)
GSP x Year2015 0.831*** 0.686***
[0.038] [0.018]
Method OLS Frac
Country FE YES
HS FE YES
Regime FE YES
Year FE YES
Country-HS-Regime FE YES
Country-HS-Year FE YES
Number of obs 1,892 2,054
R-squared 0.7663
Log pseudolikelihood -808  
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS-regime level. The dependent variable 
is the share of imports of product p from country i under preference regime r in year t out of total imports 
of product p from country i in year t. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products 
do HS nine-digit codes in the HS 61, and years do from 2013 to 2016. The preference regimes include 
AJCEP and GSP-LDC. In columns (I) and (II), we estimate our model by OLS and the fractional logit 
model (Frac), respectively. 
 
 
     We also check if our results are not driven by any other shocks to the GSP-LDC regime 
after 2014. Specifically, we estimate Eq. (1) for the shares of imports of woven apparel 
products (HS62). This analysis might be called a “placebo test”; that is, if RoOs in GSP-LDC 
for woven apparel do not change during our sample period and the change of RoOs for 
knitted apparel is expected to have no effects on imports of woven apparel, then we should 
have an insignificant coefficient for the interaction term. The results are reported in Table 4. 
The HS 62 includes 192 tariff-line codes. Again, we also estimate by the fractional logit 
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technique by replacing the fixed effects22 . Both columns in the table show insignificant 
coefficients for the interaction term as is consistent with our expectation23. 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation Results for Woven Apparel 
(I) (II)
GSP x Year2015 0.023 0.010
[0.022] [0.023]
Method OLS Frac
Country FE YES
Regime FE YES
Year FE YES
Country-HS-Regime FE YES
Country-HS-Year FE YES
Number of obs 1,576 1,682
R-squared 0.951
Log pseudolikelihood -409  
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS-regime level. The dependent variable 
is the share of imports of product p from country i under preference regime r in year t out of total imports 
of product p from country i in year t. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products 
do HS nine-digit codes only in HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. The preference regimes include 
AJCEP and GSP-LDC. In columns (I) and (II), we estimate our model by OLS and the fractional logit 
model (Frac), respectively. 
 
4.2. Absolute Impacts on Shares 
     In this subsection, we investigate the absolute effects on preference utilization rates. 
As discussed in the previous section, the relaxation of RoOs in GSP-LDC is expected to have 
positive and negative effects on the utilization rates of GSP-LDC and AJCEP, respectively. 
Therefore, our estimates above show the net effect of these two contrasting effects. To 
investigate these two effects separately, we add the utilization rates in woven apparel to our 
                                                   
22 We do not introduce product fixed effects in this estimation due to less variation across woven apparel 
products. 
23 We also investigated the heterogeneous effects of RoOs relaxation across export countries by further 
interacting export country fixed effects with the interaction term in Eq. (1). The results reported in Table 
B1 in Appendix B indicate that the positive effect is largest in exporting from Myanmar and least in 
exporting from Laos. Although we do not have any more statistical evidence to interpret these results, 
the case study by the JETRO reports that when the RoOs for knitted apparel were revised, apparel 
companies in Myanmar started to actively invest in the facility to produce knitted apparel and import 
more fabrics from China. These active adjustments to export under the single-stage processing rule may 
result in the relatively large effects found above. 
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estimation sample and then estimate the following model for imports under GSP-LDC and 
AJCEP separately: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 × 𝐻𝑆61𝑝 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 + 𝛽 ln 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑡 + u𝑖𝑝 + u𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑝𝑡.            (2) 
𝐻𝑆61𝑝 is a dummy variable taking the value of one for knitted apparel products (i.e., HS61) 
and zero for woven apparel products (i.e., HS62); hence, by taking the utilization rates for 
woven apparel as a comparison group, we examine how the utilization rates of each 
preference regime for knitted apparel change after 2014. In this model, we cannot control 
for product-year fixed effects because our interaction term has the same dimension. Thus, 
as one product-year characteristic, we control for Japan’s total imports of product p in year 
t from the world, which can be taken as a proxy for Japan’s demand size for a concerned 
product24. 
Our analysis above can be taken as a DID. The crucial assumption in this analysis, 
which is known as the stable unit treatment value assumption, is that the relaxation of RoOs 
in knitted apparel does not have any influence on preference utilization in woven apparel. 
Indeed, in Table 4, we found that RoO relaxation in knitted apparel does not significantly 
affect the relative use of either preference regime in woven apparel. Nevertheless, in both 
supply and demand sides, there will be some possible sources that have an influence on at 
least total imports of woven apparel. In the supply side, if there is some resource constraint 
in exporting countries, then the original producers of woven apparel may switch to 
producing and exporting knitted apparel. In the demand side, if knitted and woven apparel 
are substitutable for consumers, then the import increase of the former may decrease the 
imports of the latter. If knitted and woven apparel are substitutable in terms of supply and 
demand, then the import increase of knitted apparel leads to the import decrease of woven 
apparel. However, our simple correlation analysis does not show the alternative 
relationship between the total exports (imports) of knitted apparel and woven apparel25. 
The estimation results for Eq. (2) are reported in Table 5. As in the previous table, we 
estimate by the OLS and the fractional logit26. The sample tariff regime is restricted to the 
GSP-LDC in column “GSP-LDC” and to the AJCEP in column “AJCEP.” In column “GSP-
LDC,” on the one hand, we can see that the share of GSP-LDC imports significantly rises by 
32–57 percentage points. Unlike the result in Table 3, this rise is taken as an absolute effect of 
RoO relaxation on utilization rates in GSP-LDC regime. On the other hand, column "AJCEP" 
                                                   
24 As mentioned in the previous section, MFN rates do not change over time in our sample and, thus, are 
controlled by country-product fixed effects. 
25 Specifically, we examined for trade by more than 200 countries in the world, the correlation between 
total exports (imports) of knitted and woven products. As a result, we found that a 1% rise in total exports 
(imports) of woven apparel is associated with the increase in total exports (imports) of knitted apparel 
by 1.0%. Their trade patterns are not alternative. Such relationship is also found in exporting from the 
three LDCs. The results are reported in Table B2 in Appendix B. 
26  Alternatively, we may estimate the models in columns (I) and (III) simultaneously by using the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model. The results are the same in terms of coefficient magnitude 
and statistical significance as those in columns (I) and (III). 
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shows the significant decline in the share of AJCEP imports by 12–20 percentage points. In 
short, the relaxation of RoOs in GSP-LDC regime raises the share of GSP-LDC imports but 
decreases that of AJCEP imports. Conceptually, the sum of the absolute magnitude of these 
coefficients in GSP-LDC and AJCEP becomes the net effect shown in the coefficient for the 
interaction term in Table 3, though the magnitude does not become exactly same because 
the estimation model (i.e., a set of explanatory variables) is different. 
 
 
Table 5. Separate Estimation Results for GSP-LDC and AJCEP 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
HS61 x Year2015 0.567*** 0.317*** -0.197*** -0.123***
[0.026] [0.022] [0.023] [0.029]
ln Imports 0.067** 0.067* -0.054* -0.043
[0.030] [0.036] [0.032] [0.040]
Method OLS Frac OLS Frac
Country FE YES YES
HS FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Country-HS FE YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES
Number of obs 1,734 1,868 1,734 1,868
R-squared 0.8228 0.6327
Log pseudolikelihood -437 -391
GSP-LDC AJCEP
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is the 
share of imports of product p from country i under preference regime r in year t out of total imports of 
product p from country i in year t. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products 
do HS nine-digit codes in HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. The preference regimes 
include only AJCEP in column “AJCEP” and only GSP-LDC in column “GSP-LDC.” In columns (I) and 
(III), we estimate our model by OLS while the fractional logit model (Frac) is used in columns (II) and 
(IV). 
 
 
There are two other noteworthy results. One is that the absolute magnitude is larger 
in GSP-LDC than in AJCEP. This result implies the existence of new exporters under the 
GSP-LDC regime who used neither GSP-LDC nor AJCEP before, in addition to the increase 
in exports by existing GSP-LDC users. Such new exporters under GSP-LDC regime will be 
either firms who start exporting or those who switch from the MFN to the GSP-LDC regime. 
In the next subsection, we further investigate what is the main driver of this result. The other 
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result is that the coefficients for total imports are positive in GSP-LDC and negative in 
AJCEP, though the coefficient is insignificant in column (IV). This contrasting result 
indicates that the GSP-LDC regime is likely to be chosen rather than the AJCEP regime for 
products with a larger demand size in Japan27. 
 
4.3. Absolute Impacts on Levels 
     Next, we estimate Eq. (2) by replacing the dependent variable with the level of import 
values. As mentioned just above, our results in Table 5 can be driven by the increase of 
preferential exports by existing GSP-LDC users, firms switching from AJCEP or MFN to 
GSP-LDC, or their starting exporting. Indeed, even if imports under the AJCEP regime do 
not change at all, the increase in imports under the GSP-LDC regime not only raises the share 
of GSP-LDC imports but also decreases the share of AJCEP imports. To further investigate 
the sources of our results in Table 5, we replace the dependent variable in Eq. (2) with the 
level of imports under each regime 28 . The results are reported in Table 6. Not only 
preferential imports but also imports under MFN regime are also investigated. In columns 
(I), (III), and (V), we use a log of (one-plus) import values under GSP-LDC, AJCEP, or MFN 
as a dependent variable and estimate by using OLS.29 In columns (II), (IV), and (VI), on the 
other hand, we estimate for import values (without adding the value one) by the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation technique. Unlike the previous analyses, 
we also include country-product-year pairs in which any imports, regardless of tariff regime, 
are not observed, i.e., pairs with zero-valued denominators in the dependent variable in Eq. 
(2)30. 
     The results are as follows31. Imports under the GSP-LDC regime significantly increase 
after the revision of RoOs. In the case of imports under AJCEP, the OLS result shows a 
                                                   
27 In Table 6, we estimate our model for imports under GSP-LDC and AJCEP separately. In Table B3 in 
Appendix B, we pool both kinds of imports and estimate the model with 𝐻𝑆61𝑝 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 × 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑟 
and 𝐻𝑆61𝑝 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 × 𝐴𝐽𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑟, where 𝐴𝐽𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑟 is a dummy variable taking the value of one if regime 
r is AJCEP and zero if it is GSP-LDC. The results are qualitatively unchanged with those in Table 6. We 
also estimate these models by excluding woven apparel products of which the RoOs for GSP-LDC are 
the two-stage processing rule. The results are again unchanged and are reported in Table B4 in Appendix 
B. 
28 In the analysis in Table 3, the difference between the use of levels and that of shares in our dependent 
variable does not matter because we control for country-product-year fixed effects. 
29 In Table B5 in Appendix B, we also estimate the model without adding the value one. This estimation 
drastically reduces the number of observations by dropping the zero-valued imports but yields similar 
results. 
30 In Tables B7 and B8 in Appendix B, we also estimate the model by excluding those pairs. The sign and 
significance of the coefficients are not changed from those reported in Table 6. 
31 We also estimate the model by pooling preferential imports under AJCEP and GSP-LDC (see footnote 
27). The results are reported in Table B3 in Appendix B and are qualitatively unchanged from those in 
Table 6. In addition, we estimate these models by excluding woven apparel products of which the RoOs 
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significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term while it is insignificant in the PPML 
result. In either case, the absolute magnitude of the coefficients is much smaller than that in 
the case of GSP-LDC. These results indicate that firm switching from the AJCEP to the GSP-
LDC regime is not the main force of the contrasting results between the shares of GSP-LDC 
imports and AJCEP imports found in Table 5. In other words, the decrease in the share of 
AJCEP imports found in Table 5 is driven mainly by the increase of GSP-LDC imports rather 
than by the decrease of AJCEP imports. This insignificant result in AJCEP would be because 
AJCEP users already adjust their production structure to meet the RoOs in AJCEP (i.e., two-
stage processing) and do not need to switch to other preference regimes. This result may 
indicate the existence of some inertia in the utilization of preference regimes through the 
compliance of RoOs. In addition, the imports under MFN regimes significantly decrease. 
This result implies that switching from the MFN to the GSP-LDC regime is one of the main 
drivers. 
 
 
Table 6. Estimation Results: Impacts on Trade Values by Tariff Regimes 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
HS61 x Year2015 2.018*** 1.767*** -0.321*** -0.125 -0.660*** -0.898***
[0.167] [0.481] [0.107] [0.177] [0.114] [0.188]
ln Imports 0.319*** 1.383*** 0.098*** 1.538*** 0.041 0.827**
[0.082] [0.237] [0.037] [0.443] [0.047] [0.356]
Method OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML
Country FE YES YES YES
HS FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Country-HS FE YES YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES YES
Number of obs 5,217 3,405 5,217 2,100 5,217 2,856
R-squared 0.8172 0.6691 0.7808 0.6406 0.8128 0.7239
Log pseudolikelihood -1.5.E+08 -2.3.E+07 -9.5.E+06
GSP-LDC AJCEP MFN
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is a log 
of one-plus imports of product p from country i in year t in columns (I), (III), and (V), i.e., the case of OLS 
estimation. It is simply imports of product p from country i in year t, in columns (II), (IV), and (VI), i.e., 
PPML estimation. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products do HS nine-digit 
codes in HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. In columns (I), (III), and (V), we estimate our 
model by OLS while the fractional logit model (Frac) is used in columns (II), (IV), and (VI). 
                                                   
for GSP-LDC are the two-stage processing rule. The results are again unchanged and are reported in 
Tables B6 and B7 in Appendix B. 
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Figure 4. Total Impacts on Import Values 
 
Source: Table 5. 
Note: These cumulative bar charts show the magnitude of the coefficients for 𝐻𝑆61𝑝 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 
obtained in Table 5. The cases of OLS and PPML are separately provided. The sum of the coefficients in 
GSP-LDC, AJCEP, and MFN is shown as the net effect on total imports (Net). 
 
     These magnitude relations are graphically presented in Figure 4, which simply shows 
the magnitude of each coefficient obtained in Table 6 by cumulative bar charts. The cases of 
OLS and PPML are separately provided. The sum of coefficients in GSP-LDC, AJCEP, and 
MFN is shown as the net effect on total imports (“Net”), and it suggests the increase in total 
imports by 182% in OLS and 110% in PPML. Among this increase, the contribution by the 
decrease of MFN imports is larger than that by the decrease of AJCEP imports. This implies 
that switching from the MFN to the GSP-LDC regime is more relevant than their switching 
from AJCEP. Before the relaxation of RoOs, many exporters under the MFN regime were 
not able to comply with the two-stage processing rule, perhaps, because of the use of 
imported fabrics, e.g., those from China. However, they can comply with RoOs (even in the 
use of imported fabrics) after their relaxation and change their tariff regime from MFN to 
GSP-LDC to enjoy duty-free exports. Furthermore, the sum of these two decreases is still 
not enough to create the increase of GSP-LDC imports shown in the figure. Other possible 
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drivers will include the increase in exports from existing GSP-LDC users32 and the start of 
export under the GSP-LDC regime33. 
 
4.4. Price Changes 
In this section, we examine the change in import prices after the relaxation of RoOs. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the three LDCs tend to import fabrics from China, 
Japan, or Thailand, depending on RoOs. Particularly in the GSP-LDC regime, those are, 
respectively, imported from Japan and China under the two-stage and single-stage 
processing rules, whereas these LDCs import from Thailand under the two-stage processing 
rule in AJCEP. We expect that the main source of the fabrics in exporting knitted apparel 
under GSP-LDC changes from Japan to China after the relaxation of RoOs. Obviously, this 
change lowers material costs and, thus, the export price of knitted apparel because fabrics 
made in Japan are much more expensive than those from China. Indeed, during our sample 
period, the import prices of knitted or crocheted fabrics in these LDCs from Japan were 33% 
higher than those from China34. 
To investigate if the import prices of knitted apparel decrease after the relaxation of 
RoOs, we estimate the following simple equation35: 
ln 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 × 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑟 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2015𝑡 + u𝑖𝑝𝑟 + u𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑡.                     (3) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑡 is the unit import price of tariff line p from country i under preference regime r in 
year t. Our sample design is the same as in Equation (1) in Section 4.1; the sample products 
are restricted to knitted apparel products, i.e., HS 61. The sample preference regimes include 
AJCEP and GSP-LDC. With this model, we compare the price change in the imports of 
knitted apparel under GSP-LDC with that for imports under AJCEP. In the latter imports, 
the three LDCs will use fabrics mainly from Thailand and will not change their sources 
during the sample period because RoOs do not change in AJCEP. In the former imports, as 
mentioned above, the change of the main sources from Japan to China will decrease import 
prices. In short, we expect a negative sign in the coefficient for the interaction term, i.e., 𝛼. 
     The estimation results by OLS are reported in column “Knitted” in Table 7. As is 
consistent with our expectation, the coefficient for the interaction term is estimated to be 
significantly negative, indicating the decrease of import prices by 19%. This decrease is 
                                                   
32  For example, if existing GSP-LDC users change their materials to the cheaper ones through the 
relaxation of RoOs, then their exports will increase due to the reduction of variable costs. 
33 We also introduce the interaction term with a log of one-plus MFN rates in order to investigate if the 
absolute effects of relaxing RoOs are larger in the products with the larger preference margin. The results 
are reported in Table B9 in Appendix B. However, we did not find clear results. 
34 Table B10 in Appendix B also shows that import prices of knitted or crocheted fabrics in these LDCs 
from Thailand are 29% higher than those from China. 
35 We do not examine the change of imports of fabrics in the three LDCs because those imports are 
affected by policy changes in not only Japan but also other countries. 
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attributed to a switch to cheaper production materials, i.e., fabrics from China, through the 
relaxation of RoOs. Notice that if the import prices of knitted apparel under AJCEP are 
forced to be lowered by the fiercer competition with reduced import prices under GSP-LDC 
in Japan’s market, then our estimates will be underestimated but not be overestimated. As 
in Section 4.1, we estimate this model for woven apparel products only. Because RoOs do 
not change in HS 62, we will not see a significant change of import prices in the woven 
apparel products. The results are reported in the column “Woven” and show the 
insignificant coefficient for the interaction term as expected. 
 
 
Table 7. Estimation Results for Import Prices: GSP-LDC versus AJCEP 
Knitted Woven
GSP x Year2015 -0.205** -0.015
[0.098] [0.091]
Number of obs 588 272
R-squared 0.8532 0.8451  
Notes: The dependent variable is the unit price of imports of product p from country i under regime r in 
year t. ** represents significance at the 5% statistical level. Parentheses contain the heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products do HS 
nine-digit codes in the HS 61 in column “Knitted” and those in the HS 62 in column “Woven,” and years 
do from 2013 to 2016. The preference regimes include AJCEP and GSP-LDC. In both specifications, we 
control for country-HS-regime and country-HS-year fixed effects. We estimate these models by OLS. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study examined Japan’s preferential imports of apparel products from three 
LDCs, i.e., Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, during the period 2013–2016. In these trade 
flows, two preference regimes were available in addition to an MFN regime, including GSP-
LDC and AJCEP. In particular, we focused on the effect of relaxing RoOs in GSP-LDC for 
knitted apparel in 2015. As a result, we found that such relaxation not only significantly 
increased the share of GSP-LDC imports out of total imports but also resulted in reducing 
the share of AJCEP imports significantly. Furthermore, it was also found that such 
contrasting effects are not driven by firms switching their utilization across preference 
regimes but rather because the existing preference users keep using their original preference 
regimes. Last, we found evidence that the relaxation of RoOs induced the three LDCs to 
change the import source of the materials to produce the apparel products. 
There are some implications from our findings. First, connecting with the findings in 
Hayakawa et al. (2019), we revealed the interaction among tariff regimes through two key 
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elements in preference regimes, i.e., tariff rates and RoOs. Changes to the elements in one 
tariff regime potentially affect the utilization of all available regimes. Second, from the 
viewpoint of trade creation effects, we showed that the relaxation of RoOs in one preference 
regime increased the level of total trade between member countries. Although trade values 
under the other regimes decrease, the increase of those under the preference regime in 
which RoOs are relaxed is much larger in terms of absolute values. Third, our finding on 
the inertia in the choice of preference regimes implies that the timing of preference regimes’ 
entry into force persistently affects their utilization rates. The choice of preference regimes 
has a significant effect on trade with a third country through RoOs as shown in Conconi et 
al. (2018); thus, its timing plays a key role in shaping a country’s trade with the world. 
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Appendix A. Identification Strategy 
 
Figure A1. Relative Effects: GSP-LDC versus AJCEP in Knitted 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
Figure A2. Absolute Effects 
 
(a) Knitted versus Woven: GSP-LDC  (b) Knitted versus Woven: AJCEP 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Appendix B. Other Tables 
 
Table B1. Estimation Results for Knitted Apparel: Heterogeneous Effects across Export 
Countries 
(I) (II)
GSP x Year2015 0.825*** 0.646***
(Cambodia as a base country) [0.043] [0.022]
   * 1 for Laos -1.111*** -0.562***
[0.152] [0.054]
   * 1 for Myanmar 0.207*** 0.153***
[0.066] [0.034]
Method OLS Frac
Country FE YES
HS FE YES
Regime FE YES
Year FE YES
Country-HS-Regime FE YES
Country-HS-Year FE YES
Number of obs 1,892 2,054
R-squared 0.8016
Log pseudolikelihood -738  
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS-regime level. The dependent variable 
is the share of imports of product p from country i under preference regime r in year t out of total imports 
of product p from country i in year t. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products 
do HS nine-digit codes in the HS 61, and years do from 2013 to 2016. The preference regimes include 
AJCEP and GSP-LDC. 
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Table B2. Correlation between the Trade Values of Knitted Apparel and Woven Apparel 
ln Knitted Trade Export Export Import
ln Woven Trade 1.015*** 1.273*** 0.994***
[0.10] [0.338] [0.054]
Constant -0.498*** -6.094 0.022
[0.159] [6.920] [0.137]
Sample All LDC3 All
Number of obs 840 12 841
R-squared 0.9279 0.5863 0.9529  
Notes: We estimate by OLS. *** represents significance at the 1% statistical level. Parentheses contain the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error. The dependent variable in column “Export” (“Import”) is a 
log of total exports (total imports) of knitted apparel in country i in year t. Similarly, the independent 
variable in column “Export” (“Import”) is a log of total exports (total imports) of woven apparel in 
country i in year t. Sample countries include 212 countries and sample years do from 2012 to 2015. When 
“Sample” indicates “LDC3,” we restrict exporting countries to only Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. 
 
 
 
 
Table B3. Impacts on the Share and Value of Preferential Imports 
Share Value Value
HS61 x Year2015 x GSP 0.568*** 2.026*** 2.315***
[0.026] [0.167] [0.204]
HS61 x Year2015 x AJCEP -0.199*** -0.329*** -0.390*
[0.023] [0.107] [0.233]
ln Imports 0.006 0.209*** 0.866***
[0.021] [0.045] [0.227]
Plus one in a dep. var. YES NO
Number of obs 3,468 10,434 1,968
R-squared 0.8436 0.8121 0.8370  
Notes: *** represents significance at the 1% statistical level. Parentheses contain the standard error 
clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is the share of preferential imports under each 
regime in column “Share.” In column “Value,” it is a log of the preferential imports. In “YES” (“NO”) for 
“Plus one in a dep. var.,” we add (do not add) the value one to the preference imports before taking a log. 
We estimate by OLS and include country-product-regime and country-regime-year fixed effects in both 
columns. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products do HS nine-digit codes in 
HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. The preference regimes include AJCEP and GSP-LDC. 
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Table B4. Separate Estimation Results for GSP-LDC and AJCEP 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
HS61 x Year2015 0.559*** 0.291*** -0.192*** -0.101***
[0.026] [0.022] [0.023] [0.028]
ln Imports 0.063** 0.059* -0.052* -0.036
[0.029] [0.034] [0.031] [0.039]
Method OLS Frac OLS Frac
Country FE YES YES
HS FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Country-HS FE YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES
Number of obs 1,692 1,815 1,692 1,815
R-squared 0.8293 0.6317
Log pseudolikelihood -412 -382
GSP-LDC AJCEP
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is the 
share of imports of product p from country i under preference regime r in year t out of total imports of 
product p from country i in year t. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products 
do HS nine-digit codes in HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. The preference regimes 
include only AJCEP in column “AJCEP” and only GSP-LDC in column “GSP-LDC.” In this table, we 
exclude woven apparel products of which the RoOs for GSP-LDC are the two-stage processing rule. 
 
 
Table B5. Estimation Results: Impacts on Trade Values by Tariff Regimes 
GSP-LDC AJCEP MFN
HS61 x Year2015 2.318*** -0.388* -0.786***
[0.204] [0.232] [0.176]
ln Imports 0.796*** 1.112** 0.247
[0.248] [0.522] [0.315]
Number of obs 1,321 647 940
R-squared 0.8601 0.7145 0.7818  
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is a log 
of imports of product p from country i in year t. We estimate by OLS. Sample countries include Cambodia, 
Laos, and Myanmar, products do HS nine-digit codes in HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. 
In all specifications, we include country-HS and country-year fixed effects. 
  
32 
 
 
Table B6. Estimation Results: Impacts on Trade Values by Tariff Regimes 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
HS61 x Year2015 1.960*** 1.767*** -0.292** -0.139 -0.611*** -0.885***
[0.177] [0.481] [0.114] [0.187] [0.121] [0.205]
ln Imports 0.331*** 1.384*** 0.107*** 1.558*** 0.035 0.825**
[0.088] [0.237] [0.040] [0.448] [0.048] [0.364]
Method OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML
Country FE YES YES YES
HS FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Country-HS FE YES YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES YES
Number of obs 4,908 3,309 4,908 2,052 4,908 2,724
R-squared 0.817 0.6686 0.7791 0.6408 0.8157 0.7169
Log pseudolikelihood -1.5.E+08 -2.3.E+07 -9.3.E+06
GSP-LDC AJCEP MFN
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is a log 
of one-plus imports of product p from country i in year t in columns (I), (III), and (V), i.e., the case of OLS 
estimation. It is simply imports of product p from country i in year t in columns (II), (IV), and (VI), i.e., 
PPML estimation. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products do HS nine-digit 
codes in HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. In this table, we exclude woven apparel 
products of which the RoOs for GSP-LDC are the two-stage processing rule. 
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Table B7. Estimation Results: Impacts on Trade Values 
GSP-LDC AJCEP MFN GSP-LDC AJCEP MFN
HS61 x Year2015 2.335*** -0.408* -0.778*** 2.318*** -0.388* -0.786***
[0.204] [0.239] [0.182] [0.204] [0.232] [0.176]
ln Imports 0.787*** 1.122** 0.207 0.796*** 1.112** 0.247
[0.249] [0.524] [0.315] [0.248] [0.522] [0.315]
Number of obs 1,298 639 913 1,321 647 940
R-squared 0.8576 0.7096 0.7799 0.8601 0.7145 0.7818
Model (I) Model (II)
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is a log 
of imports of product p from country i in year t. We estimate by OLS. In all specifications, we include 
country-HS and country-year fixed effects. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, 
products do HS nine-digit codes in HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. In Model (I), we 
exclude woven apparel products of which the RoOs for GSP-LDC are the two-stage processing rule. In 
Model (II), we do not include country-product-year pairs in which any imports, regardless of tariff 
regimes not being observed. 
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Table B8. Estimation Results: Impacts on Trade Values 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
HS61 x Year2015 5.907*** 1.670*** -1.346*** -0.169 -2.375*** -0.914***
[0.281] [0.487] [0.318] [0.179] [0.308] [0.189]
ln Imports 0.962*** 1.355*** 0.236 1.346*** 0.517 0.810**
[0.370] [0.247] [0.447] [0.438] [0.444] [0.382]
Method OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML
Country FE YES YES YES
HS FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Country-HS FE YES YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES YES
Number of obs 1,734 1,817 1,734 1,344 1,734 1,641
R-squared 0.8204 0.6546 0.749 0.6445 0.762 0.7145
Log pseudolikelihood -1.4.E+08 -2.0.E+07 -8.3.E+06
GSP-LDC AJCEP MFN
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. The dependent variable is a log 
of one-plus preferential imports of product p from country i in year t, in columns (I) and (III), i.e., the case 
of OLS estimation. It is simply preferential imports of product p from country i in year t in columns (II) 
and (IV), i.e., PPML estimation. Sample countries include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products do 
HS nine-digit codes in HS 61 and HS62, and years do from 2013 to 2016. Compared with Table 6, this 
table does not include country-product-year pairs in which any imports, regardless of tariff regimes not 
being observed. 
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Table B9. Interaction with MFN Tariffs 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (IV)
GSP x Year2015 0.651***
[0.230]
   * ln MFN 1.942
[2.424]
HS61 x Year2015 0.421*** -0.256** -2.064*** 0.456
[0.118] [0.127] [0.644] [0.400]
   * ln MFN 1.564 0.634 46.686*** -8.891*
[1.235] [1.333] [7.298] [4.753]
ln Imports 0.064** -0.056* 0.276*** 0.106***
[0.030] [0.032] [0.079] [0.037]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Product Knitted Both Both Both Both
Dependent variable Share Share Share Level Level
Preference regimes Both GSP-LDC AJCEP GSP-LDC AJCEP
Country-HS-Regime FE YES
Country-HS-Year FE YES
Country-HS FE YES YES YES YES
Country-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Number of obs 1,892 1,734 1,734 5,217 5,217
R-squared 0.7666 0.8233 0.633 0.8208 0.7811  
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. 
Parentheses contain the standard error clustered at the country-HS level. 
 
 
Table B10. Differences in Import Prices of Knitted Apparel from China, Japan, and Thailand 
Base: China ln Price
Dummy for Japan 0.283**
[0.129]
Dummy for Thailand 0.252**
[0.109]
Number of obs 315
R-squared 0.4322  
Notes: ** represents significance at the 5% statistical level. Parentheses contain the heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error. The dependent variable is the unit price of imports of product p (defined at an 
HS six-digit level) from country i in year t. Sample export countries include China, Japan, and Thailand, 
import countries do Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, products do HS six-digit codes in HS 61, and years 
do from 2013 to 2016. The data on the unit import prices are obtained from the UN Comtrade. Import 
country-product and year fixed effects are controlled. 
